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Abstract
Remote sensors are becoming the standard
for observing and recording ecological data
in the field. Such sensors can record data at
fine temporal resolutions, and they can oper-
ate under extreme conditions prohibitive to
human access. Unfortunately, sensor data
streams exhibit many kinds of errors rang-
ing from corrupt communications to partial
or total sensor failures. This means that the
raw data stream must be cleaned before it
can be used by domain scientists. In our
application environment—the H.J. Andrews
Experimental Forest—this data cleaning is
performed manually. This paper introduces
a Dynamic Bayesian Network model for ana-
lyzing sensor observations and distinguishing
sensor failures from valid data for the case of
air temperature measured at 15 minute time
resolution. The model combines an accu-
rate distribution of long-term and short-term
temperature variations with a single general-
ized fault model. Experiments with histor-
ical data show that the precision and recall
of the method is comparable to that of the
domain expert. The system is currently be-
ing deployed to perform real-time automated
data cleaning.
1 INTRODUCTION
The ecosystem sciences are on the brink of a huge
transformation in the quantity of sensor data that
is being collected and made available via the web.
Old sensor technologies that measure temperature,
wind, precipitation, and stream flow at a small number
of spatially distributed stations are being augmented
by dense wireless sensor networks that can measure
everything from sapflow to gas concentrations. Data
streams from existing and new sensor networks are be-
ing posted directly to the web. The resulting explosion
in data is likely to transform ecology from an analyti-
cal and computational science into a data exploration
science (Gray & Szalay, 2002).
Unfortunately, raw sensor data streams can contain
many kinds of errors. Sensors can be damaged by ex-
treme weather, information can be corrupted during
data transmission, and environmental conditions and
technical errors can change the meaning of the sensor
data (e.g., an air temperature sensor buried in snow is
no longer measuring air temperature, two thermome-
ters whose cables are swapped during maintenance will
not be measuring the intended temperatures, etc.). In
current practice, data streams undergo a quality as-
surance (QA) process before they are made available
to scientists. This is typically a manual process in
which an expert technician visualizes the data in var-
ious ways looking for outliers, unusual events, and so
on. But this manual approach has two obvious draw-
backs. First, it is slow, expensive, and tedious. This
introduces a substantial delay (3-6 months) between
the time the data is collected and the time the data is
made publicly available. Second, it will not scale up
to the large amounts of data that will be collected by
dense sensor networks. Hence, there is a need for au-
tomated methods for “cleaning” the data streams to
flag suspicious data points and either call them to the
attention of the technician or automatically remove
incorrect values and impute corrected values.
This paper describes a Dynamic Bayesian Network
(DBN, Dean & Kanazawa, 1988) approach to auto-
matic data cleaning for individual air temperature
data streams. The DBN combines discrete and condi-
tional linear-Gaussian random variables to model the
air temperature at 15 minute intervals as a function
of diurnal, seasonal, and local trend effects. Because
the set of potential faults is unbounded, it is not prac-
tical to approach this as a diagnosis problem where
each fault is modeled separately. Instead, we employ
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a very general fault model and focus our efforts on
making the DBN model of normal behavior highly ac-
curate. The hope is that if the observed temperature
is unlikely based on the temperature model, the fault
model will become more likely. The DBN contains two
hidden variables: the current state of the sensor and
the current temperature trend (as a departure from
the baseline temperature). The model is applied on-
line as a filter to decide the state of the sensor at each
15 minute point. If the sensor is believed to be bad,
the observed temperature is ignored by the DBN un-
til the sensor returns to normal. As a side effect, the
model predicts what the true temperature was during
periods of time when the sensor is bad.
Belief Networks (Pearl, 1988) have been employed for
sensor validation and fault detection in domains such
as robotic movement, chemical reactor, and power
plant monitoring (Nicholson & Brady, 1992; Mehran-
bod et al., 2003; Ibarguengoytia et al., 1996). Typi-
cally, the uncertainty in these domains is limited to the
sensor’s functionality. That is, the processes in these
domains function within some set boundaries with a
behavior that can be modeled by a system of known
equations (Aradhye, 1997). Ecological domains are
challenging, because accurate process models encom-
passing all relevant factors are typically unavailable
(Hill & Minsker, 2006). Thus, uncertainty must be
incorporated into both the process and sensor models.
This paper is organized as follows. We first discuss
the nature of the temperature data, the sensor sites at
the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest, and the anom-
aly types encountered. Second, we describe the tem-
perature prediction model, including training and in-
ference. Finally, we present the results of the model
applied to temperature data from the Andrews.
2 APPLICATION DOMAIN
2.1 ATMOSPHERIC DATA AT THE
ANDREWS
We focus our application on twelve air temperature
sensors distributed over three meteorological stations
at the H.J. Andrews Experimental Forest, a Long
Term Ecological (LTER) site located in the central
Cascade Region of Oregon. The three meteorological
stations—Primary, Central, and Upper Lookout—are
located at elevations of 430 meters, 1005 meters, and
1280 meters, respectively. Each site contains four air
temperature sensors mounted on a sensor tower. The
sensors are placed at heights of 1.5 meters, 2.5 meters,
3.5 meters, and 4.5 meters above ground level. The
sensors record the ambient air temperature every 15
minutes and transmit the recorded value to a data log-
ger located at the meteorological (“met”) station. The
logger periodically transmits the batch data back to a
receiving station at the Andrews Headquarters, where
it is reviewed by a domain expert before being made
available for public download (McKee, 2005). There
are 96 observations (quarter-hour intervals) per day
and 35,040 observations per year. During the winter
and during strong storms and floods, the Central and
Upper Lookout stations are usually inaccessible.
The observed air temperature data contains significant
diurnal (time of day) and seasonal (day of year) ef-
fects. Temperature rises in the morning and falls in
the evening (the diurnal effect). Temperatures are
higher in the summer and colder in the winter (the
seasonal effect). These effects interact so that in the
summer, the diurnal effect is more pronounced—the
temperature swings are larger and the temperature
rises and falls faster—than in the winter. In addi-
tion, weather systems (cold fronts, heat waves) cause
medium term (1-10 day) departures from the temper-
atures that would be expected based only on the diur-
nal and seasonal effects. Figure 1 illustrates diurnal,
seasonal, and weather effects on air temperature.
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Figure 1: Seasonal, Diurnal, and Weather effects
Week five and week thirty-two demonstrate the sea-
sonal effect on air temperature (winter and summer,
respectively), whereas week seven illustrates a weather
event suppressing the diurnal effect for the first four
days of the week.
2.2 DEGREES OF ANOMALY
We classify anomaly types found in the air tempera-
ture data into three categories based on subtlety of the
anomaly in the context of the data.
2.2.1 Simple Anomalies
We consider simple anomalies to be observations far
outside the range of acceptable temperatures. These
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anomalies are introduced deliberately by the data log-
ger. If the sensor is disconnected from the data logger,
the logger records a value of −53.3. If the logger re-
ceives a voltage outside the measurement range for the
sensor, the logger records a value of −6999. These two
are the most common anomaly types, because sensor
disconnections and damage to the wiring may persist
for long periods of time depending on the accessibility
of the sensor. Figure 2 contains two such examples.
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Figure 2: Top: 4.5m voltage out of range, −6999.9
fault value. Bottom: 1.5m disconnected from logger,
−53.3 fault value
2.2.2 Medium Anomalies
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
5
10
20
30
Central Met., Week 6, 1996
15 Minute Interval
Te
m
p.
 (C
)
1.5m Sensor
2.5m Sensor
3.5m Sensor
4.5m Sensor
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
−
10
0
5
10
20
Upper Lookout Met., Weeks 3−7, 1996
15 Minute Interval
Te
m
p.
 (C
)
1.5m Sensor
2.5m Sensor
3.5m Sensor
4.5m Sensor
Figure 3: Top: Broken Sun Shield, Bottom: 1.5m Sen-
sor buried under snowpack, 2.5m Sensor dampened
This anomaly type is associated with malfunctions in
the sensor hardware or change in functionality of the
sensor. For example, if the sensor’s sun shield becomes
damaged or lost, then direct sunlight exposure intro-
duces a positive bias in the recorded value. These
anomaly types are correlated with external weather
conditionsand hence contain many of the same trend
effects as the valid data, which makes them harder to
detect. Figure 3 contains two such examples.
The first plot illustrates the loss of a sun shield on the
1.5m sensor, which raises the recorded temperature by
approximately 5
 
. It is important to note that this
bias disappears during the nighttime periods and also
on cloudy days (which probably explains why the bias
is missing during the last two days of the week).
The second plot results from a snowpack that has
buried the 1.5m sensor by the 200th quarter-hour mea-
surement. This sensor records the temperature as a
near-constant −2
 
for approximately 3 weeks. No-
tice that the 2.5m sensor is also affected by the snow:
its diurnal behavior is significantly dampened. Indeed,
we can observe that the snow first buries the 1.5m sen-
sor before affecting the 2.5m sensor and that, as the
snowpack melts, the 2.5m sensor returns to nominal
behavior before the 1.5m sensor.
2.2.3 Complex Anomalies
We reserve this classification for anomalies that are so
subtle that they cannot be captured without the use of
additional sensors. An example of a complex anomaly
is a switch in sensor cables between two adjacent sen-
sors on a tower. Because under normal conditions the
two sensor readings differ by only a fraction of a degree
Celsius, if we examine only one of the sensor streams,
we cannot detect the anomaly. However, a model of
the joint distribution of all four sensors on the tower
should be able to capture the fact that the relative or-
der of the sensor values reflects their physical order on
the tower. Specifically, the 4.5m sensor is the hottest
of the four in the mid-afternoon and the coolest of the
four in the middle of the night. Because the present
paper only models individual sensor streams, we do
not expect it to detect these complex anomalies.
3 DOMAIN MODELING
We employ a Conditional Linear Gaussian (CLG)
(Lauritzen, 1992) DBN to model the interaction be-
tween a single sensor and the air temperature process.
Each slice of temporal model represents a fifteen-
minute interval, as this is the time granularity of our
sensor observations. However, our model also contains
two observed discrete variables representing the cur-
rent time window:
1. QH = 1, ..., 96 Representing the current quarter-
hour of the day
2. Day = 1, ..., 365 Representing the current day of
the year.
Thus, every slice is associated with a unique
(QH = qh,Day = d) pair. Further discussion will be
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split into the process model governing air temperature
change and the model for sensor behavior.
3.1 THE PROCESS MODEL
For any given time step and (qh, d), we assume the
actual temperature, T , is a function of some learned
baseline value, B (please see the below section for
discussion of the baseline value), and a value repre-
senting the current departure from the baseline value,
∆. That is, we estimate the distribution over T as
T ∼ N
(
∆ + B, σ2T
)
.
The ∆ variable can be interpreted as representing a
temporally local trend effect, such a warm/cold front
or a storm. Its purpose is to capture the differ-
ence between our baseline expectation for the tem-
perature at a given time of day/day of year and the
observed temperature during periods of nominal sen-
sor behavior. We model ∆ as a first-order Markov
process with the current (qh, d) as additional non-
Markovian, observed inputs. Thus, ∆ has the distri-
bution ∆ ∼ N
(
µqh,d + w∆t−1, σ
2
qh,d
)
. The Markov
process allows the ∆ distribution to “wander” in or-
der to capture growing or diminishing trend effects.
By conditioning the distribution on QH and D, we
can account for sharper temperature shifts associated
with particular (qh, d) pairs. For example: the tem-
perature rises and falls more quickly as a result of diur-
nal effects in summer months than in winter months.
To account for this, ∆ must be able to change more
rapidly (have increased variance) during these periods
of the day and season.
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Figure 4: Process model for air temperature. Rec-
tangles depict discrete variables, ovals depict normally
distributed variables. Shaded variables are observed.
3.1.1 Calculating the Baseline
The baseline value for a particular (qh, d) pair esti-
mates the temperature for that time interval after re-
moving short-term trends due to weather systems. Ini-
tially, it may seem appropriate to simply average tem-
perature values for a given (qh, d) pair across all of
the training years; however, as we have only a few
training years, there is too much variance in sample
means to provide a good estimate. To address this,
we apply a moving average kernel smoother across
the M days on either side of the current day and the
N quarter-hour periods on either side of the current
quarter hour. However, if we only used this simple
smoother, it would be biased low at times when the
second derivative of the temperature was negative (at
the point of maximum temperature) and biased high
at times when the second derivative of the tempera-
ture was positive. To correct for this, we compute the
first derivative Q(d, qh, t, y) for each (u, t) offset, and
use this to remove the short-term linear trend in the
temperature curve:
Bqh,d = c
∑
y,u,t
T (d + u, qh + t, y)−Q (d, qh, t, y)
c = [Y (2M + 1) (2N + 1)]
−1
,
y ∈ {1, ..., Y } denotes the year index.
u ∈ {−M, ...,M} denotes the day offset.
t ∈ {−N, ..., N} denotes the quarter-hour offset.
T (d, qh, y) training value for given (d, qh, y) tuple.
Q (d, qh, t, y) is the first-derivative offset function that
calculates the average deviation from the current
quarter-hour to t over a 2M + 1 day window. It is
calculated as Q (d, qh, t, y) =
(2M + 1)
−1
∑
u
T (d + u, qh + t, y)− T (d + u, qh, y) .
3.2 INTEGRATING THE SENSOR
Based on our discussions with the expert, we have
identified several anomaly types in the temperature
data streams. However, we are not confident that we
have found all anomaly types. Each time we meet
with the expert, we learn about a new anomaly, and
there is no reason to expect that the set of anomalies
is fixed. Hence, rather than attempting to model each
type of anomaly separately, which would lead to a sys-
tem that could only recognize a fixed set of anom-
aly types, we decided to develop a single, very gen-
eral fault model that is able to capture most of the
known anomaly types and (we hope) unknown types
as well. We model the state of the sensor, S, as a
discrete variable that summarizes the degree of sen-
sor functionality. We chose four levels (“very good”,
“good”, “bad”, “very bad”), because these are the
levels that the expert technician uses in the current
QA process. The state S is modeled as a first-order
Markov process, which allows us to capture the fact
that good sensors tend to stay good and bad sensors
tend to stay bad. The observed temperature, O, is
distributed as N(µs +wsT, σ
2
s), where the values of σ
2
s
capture how well the observed temperature is tracking
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the true temperature as a function of the current state
S = s. Figure 5 depicts the full domain model.
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Figure 5: Integrated single-sensor and process model.
4 METHODS
We obtained seven years of raw air temperature from
the H. J. Andrews Experimental Forest. This data
had been processed by the domain expert to mark
all anomalous data points. The domain expert tends
to mark regions as anomalous even when some of the
readings within those regions are ok. For example, if
a sun shield was missing, the expert would mark the
entire time interval when the shield was missing as
anomalous even though at night time and on cloudy
days the temperature readings are accurate.
4.1 PARAMETERIZATION
For each of the meteorological stations, we selected
three years of data as our testing set. From this set
we removed all data points labeled anomalous by the
expert, and trained on the remaining data. We calcu-
lated a baseline value for every (qh, d) pair as described
in section 3.1.1, with the number of days M = 3 and
the number of quarter hours N = 5. Using these
values, we then iterated through the training set and
calculated ∆(y, d, qh) as T (y, d, qh) − B(d, qh), where
T (y, d, qh) is the recorded temperature for that year,
day, and quarter-hour, and B(d, qh) is the baseline.
To fit the conditional distribution for ∆, we smooth
over a 31-day window. We compute the mean of ∆qh,d
as
µqh,d = (Y M)
−1
∑
y,u
∆(y, d+u, qh)−∆(y, d+u, qh−1)
and the variance as
σ2qh,d = (Y M)
−1
∑
y,u
(∆(y, d + u, qh)− µqh,d)
2
,
where Y = 4 is the number of years, and M = 31 is
the number of days.
We manually tuned the parameters for the predicted
temperature (T ), the observed temperature (O), and
the sensor (S) variables to implement the generic fault
model. The sensor can be in one of four states:
{Very Good, Good, Bad, Very Bad}. The first three
states assert equality between the mean of the pre-
dicted and observed temperatures, and the last state
encompasses anomalies with no correlation to T .
Table 1: Observed Temperature as a function of Sensor
State and Predicted Temperature
SENSOR STATE DISTRIBUTION
O|St = V eryGood N (T, 1.0)
O|St = Good N (T, 5.0)
O|St = Bad N (T, 10.0)
O|St = V eryBad N (0, 100000)
We calculate the actual temperature as the sum of the
baseline and the current ∆ offset. We assign weights
of 1.0 for both these variables and set ∆’s mean to 0.
Further, we supply ∆ with a very-low, non-zero vari-
ance. The distribution over the observed temperature
is tied to the state of the sensor, and thus we can use
the sensor state to explain large residuals between the
observed and predicted temperature. In cases where
the sensor is believed to be functioning nominally, the
observed temperature should be the predicted temper-
ature with some minimal variance. If we believe the
sensor is malfunctioning, we allow the observed tem-
perature to take on additional variance yet still reflect
the mean of the predicted temperature. In cases where
we believe the sensor is completely failing, we set the
weight from the predicted temperature to 0, and assign
a huge variance to O. Table 1 displays the distribution
of O given the state of S.
4.2 INFERENCE
We perform inference in our network using a vari-
ation on the Forward Algorithm (Rabiner, 1989)
and Bucket Elimination adapted for CLG networks
(Dechter, 1996; Lauritzen, 1992). The Forward Al-
gorithm computes the marginal for every step of a
Markov process and passes that distribution forward
as the alpha message. The Bucket Elimination al-
gorithm is a dynamic-programming, exact-inference
method that represents potentials as buckets and mar-
ginalizes out variables iteratively until only the desired
potential remains.
Table 2 outlines our modified Forward inference
method. The two modifications to the Forward algo-
rithm occur in steps 3 and 5. In 3, we enforce a decision
about the state of the sensor and use its most likely
value to constrain the distribution on ∆ computed in
4. In other words, at each step, we compute the pos-
terior distribution over S and then force S to take on
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its most likely value. This is necessary to prevent the
variance associated with ∆ from growing rapidly.
Table 2: Modified Forward Algorithm
1. Enter evidence for observed variables: QH, Day,
B, and O
2. Compute the posterior for St as the new alpha
message, αS
3. Enter the most likely value of St,
argmax
s
P (St = s| O1:t), as the data label for time t and
as additional evidence.
4. Compute posterior for ∆t as the new alpha mes-
sage, α∆
5. If s = Very Bad, then set variance of α∆ to
min  σ2qh,d, σ
2
x  where σ
2
qh,d is the regular variance
of ∆ for that (qh, d) pair and σ2x is the calculated
variance of α∆
6. Update St−1 to αQ and ∆t−1 to α∆ (pass α mes-
sages forward) and return to 1.
Consider the elimination ordering in Table 3. The po-
tential in (1) will fail to sufficiently constrain the vari-
ance of ∆t, because there is always a non-zero prob-
ability that St = Very Bad. The high variance asso-
ciated with the general fault state of the sensor then
removes the constraining effect the observation O pro-
vides. By entering evidence for the sensor state before
computing the posterior of ∆t, we eliminate this prob-
lem. The additional observation for St changes the
expression in (1) to:
P (O = o|St = s, T )P (T |B = b,∆t) = Pot(∆t)
and removes the potential calculated in (4). Pot(∆t)
sufficiently constrains ∆t’s variance for all values of st
except Very Bad. We address the latter case in step 5
of our algorithm (Table 2) by setting an upper limit on
the variance of the posterior. The limit is the trained
variance parameter for ∆ for the current (qh, d) pair.
Table 3: Bucket Elimination for P (∆t) Elimination
Ordering: T,∆t, St, S
P (O = o|St, T ) P (T |B = b, ∆t) = Pot (∆t|St) (1)
P (∆t|∆t−1) P (∆t−1) = Pot (∆t) (2)
P (St|St−1) P (St−1) = Pot (St) (3)
Pot (∆t|St) Pot (St) = Pot (∆t)
′
(4)
Pot (∆t) Pot (∆t)
′
(5)
5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We test our method over four years of labeled data
from the H.J. Andrews (3 held out for training). Train-
ing and testing years were individually selected for
each site with a preference for years including few or
no anomalies in the training set, and years exhibiting
the largest diversity of anomaly types used for testing.
We analyze our results in terms of anomaly difficulty,
and then introduce an additional classification method
designed to approximate the behavior of the domain
expert. Finally, we report overall precision and recall
with regard to our classification system.
5.1 SIMPLE ANOMALIES
Figure 6 shows a typical result provided by the model
for intermittent sensor faults associated with a volt-
age error in the sensor. We omit the Good and
Very Good labels for clarity. Note that all values of
−6999.9
 
were correctly labeled as Very Bad ; also,
the model produced no false positives for the week
shown. The predicted temperatures values inserted in
place of those labeled anomalous closely resemble the
neighboring valid segments of the data stream.
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Figure 6: Top: Original data stream containing a
faulty 4.5m sensor. Bottom: Data cleaning results for
the 4.5m sensor. Plotted points indicate the mean of
the predicted temperature distribution.
5.2 MEDIUM ANOMALIES
Let us consider the broken sun shield anomaly intro-
duced in Section 2.2.2. Figure 7 (bottom) shows the
labeling provided by our method on an anomalous sec-
tion of data. The model correctly identifies the ascend-
ing and descending segments of the day as anomalous,
while labeling those periods unaffected by the broken
sun shield (nighttime and periods of cloud cover) as
normal. On some days, the model correctly labels
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the peak of the diurnal period as anomalous, but in
other cases (e.g., t=260), it does not. This is because
the short-term behavior at the peak looks normal (ex-
cept for its absolute value): the temperature reaches
its high for the day, it holds steady for a short pe-
riod, and then begins to decrease. The reduced rate of
change in temperature between time slices then falls
within the range of ∆’s variance, so it is labeled as
non-anomalous. Note that the model-predicted tem-
perature slightly lags the observed 4.5m temperature.
This matches the 1.5m, 2.5m, and 3.5m sensors, which
are labeled by the domain expert as functioning nom-
inally for this period and corrects for the incorrect ac-
celeration/deceleration introduced by the fault.
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Figure 7: Top: Lost sun shield in 1.5m sensor. Bot-
tom: Data cleaning applied to 1.5m sensor. Points
indicate the mean of the predicted distribution.
5.3 CLASS WIDENING
As a result of working at very fine time granulari-
ties, the domain expert tends to “over-label” faults
(i.e., marking long segments as faulty even though
only some of the points in those segments are actually
faulty). We correct for this behavior when directly
comparing our classification to the expert’s by intro-
ducing a widening method. For any point labeled as
anomalous (Bad or Very Bad) by both the expert and
our system, we widen our classification by assigning
the same class to λ points before and after the current
quarter hour. We apply this widening only to those
anomalous types we consider to be non-trivial as the
expert is very precise in labeling of trivial anomalies.
5.4 PRECISION AND RECALL
Figure 8 displays the precision and recall results for
each of the meteorological stations over a range of λ
values for the aforementioned widening method. The
diamond-marked line represents the average perfor-
mance among all three sites. It is clear that the
Central met. station benefits the most from widen-
ing, which is a result of that site containing many
medium-type anomalies (broken sun-shield predomi-
nately). This method allows us to tune our system
to catch more anomalies at the cost of some preci-
sion. For example, by increasing λ from 0 (individual
labeling) to 200 (2 day window on either side of the
current quarter hour), we have increased our average
recall from 55% to 77%; however, we have done so at
the cost of increasing our FP-rate from 2.4% to 5.3%.
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Figure 8: Precision and Recall as a function of λ.
Marked increments of 100.
Comparing our model results to the domain expert la-
bels across all data sets, we obtain the following: Pre-
cision = 0.377, Recall = 0.768, and False-Positive Rate
(Specificity) = 0.053. However, these overall numbers
hide many different situations. The plot in Figure 9
shows the precision and recall values for all 48 test sets
(four years of data, 12 data streams per year) evalu-
ated at λ = 200. The boxes in the figure identify in-
teresting clusters of behavior. The largest cluster of
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Figure 9: (a) infrequent, simple anomalies, (b) short-
duration simple and medium anomalies, and (c) long-
duration simple and medium anomalies.
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situations is indicated by box (a). These 17 data sets
have a recall > .9 and precision < .2. They represent
years having 0 to 314 anomalies (median= 13). Most
of these anomalies are simple and infrequent. Given
our FP-Rate (on average .053 × 35040 = 1857 FPs
per year), the abundance of such data sets diminishes
our overall precision. However, as we are maintaining
near-100% recall for these years, we are still reducing
by over 94% the amount data that the domain expert
must review manually without missing any anomalies.
The 11 data sets indicated by box (b) all contain short
continuous periods of anomalies caused by voltage er-
rors (in the case of the Primary Met errors) or sun-
shield/snow-dampening medium anomaly types (Cen-
tral Met and Upper Lookout). The median anomaly
count (TP + FN) in data sets in (b) is 628, which
increases precision considerably compared to (a) by
mitigating the effect of the FP-rate.
Box (c) contains 6 data sets with recall > .6 and pre-
cision > .7. These data sets contain long-duration
simple and medium anomalies (median= 11116). The
2 years from Upper Lookout with precision > .8 de-
note years in which the 1.5m sensor was disconnected
for the winter, resulting in a stream of faulty values.
The 2 Upper Lookout years with precision ≈ .7 denote
medium anomaly types caused by snow-pack around
the 1.5m sensor and a non-trivial voltage range error.
The points immediately below (c) in the scatter-
plot show a precision-recall trade-off associated with
sensor-swapped values. Specifically, years with pro-
longed sensor swaps tend to yield higher precision
scores due to most of the values being labeled anom-
alous by the domain expert. As a result, any point
our system labels as anomalous will be matched by
the expert labeling; however, recall remains low for
these years, as our system is as of yet unable to detect
all of these complex anomalies. The two years hav-
ing 0 precision/recall each contain a single anomalous
value that our system failed to detect and have yet to
be explained by the domain expert.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The domain expert is very pleased with the perfor-
mance of the model. Virtually all existing data QA
tools only work by comparing multiple data streams.
The fact that our model can find medium-difficulty
anomalies (such as sun shield failures) by analyzing
only a single data stream is surprising. We are cur-
rently deploying the model at the H. J. Andrews LTER
site. The raw data will be processed by the model
and then immediately posted on the web site (along
with a disclaimer that an experimental automated QA
process is being used). This will significantly enhance
the timeliness and availability of the data. The man-
ual QA process will still be performed later, but using
the model to focus the expert’s time and attention.
To detect more subtle anomaly types (swapping be-
tween sensor leads, snow pack, etc.), our model must
exploit the spatiotemporal correlations between sen-
sors. In addition to providing a means of detecting
additional sensor faults, this extension to the model
will allow us predict with greater certainty the actual
temperature in situations where at least two of the
four sensors are functioning correctly.
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